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Abstract— We consider a security problem for intercon-
nected systems governed by linear, discrete, time-invariant,
stochastic dynamics, where the objective is to detect ex-
ogenous attacks by processing the measurements at differ-
ent locations. We consider two classes of detectors, namely
centralized and decentralized detectors, which differ pri-
marily in their knowledge of the system model. In particular,
a decentralized detector has a model of the dynamics of
the isolated subsystems, but is unaware of the intercon-
nection signals that are exchanged among subsystems.
Instead, a centralized detector has a model of the entire
dynamical system. We characterize the performance of the
two detectors and show that, depending on the system and
attack parameters, each of the detectors can outperform the
other. In particular, it may be possible for the decentralized
detector to outperform its centralized counterpart, despite
having less information about the system dynamics, and
this surprising property is due to the nature of the consid-
ered attack detection problem. To complement our results
on the detection of attacks, we propose and solve an opti-
mization problem to design attacks that maximally degrade
the system performance while maintaining a pre-specified
degree of detectability. Finally, we validate our findings via
numerical studies on an electric power system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems are becoming increasingly more
complex and interconnected. In fact, different cyber-physical
systems typically operate in a connected environment, where
the performance of each system is greatly affected by neigh-
boring units. An example is the smart grid, which arises
from the interconnection of smaller power systems at different
geographical locations, and whose performance depends on
other critical infrastructures including the transportation net-
work and the water system. Given the interconnected nature of
large cyber-physical systems, and the fact that each subsystem
usually has only partial knowledge or measurements of other
interconnected units, the security question arises as to whether
sophisticated attackers can hide their action to the individual
subsystems while inducing system-wide critical perturbations.
In this work we investigate whether, and to what extent,
coordination among different subsystems and knowledge of
the global system dynamics is necessary to detect attacks in
interconnected systems. In fact, while existing approaches for
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the detection of faults and attacks typically rely on a cen-
tralized detector [1]–[3], the use of local detectors would not
only be computationally convenient, but it would also prevent
the subsystems from disclosing private information about their
plants. As a counterintuitive result, we will show that local
and decentralized detectors can, in some cases, outperform
a centralized detector, thus supporting the development of
distributed and localized theories and tools for the security
of cyber-physical systems.
Related work: Centralized attack detectors have been the sub-
ject of extensive research in the last years [4]–[12], where the
detector has complete knowledge of the system dynamics and
all measurements. Furthermore, these studies use techniques
from various disciplines including game theory, information
theory, fault detection and signal processing, and have a
wide variety of applications [2]. Instead, decentralized attack
detectors, where each local detector decides on attacks based
on partial information and measurements about the system, and
local detectors cooperate to improve their detection capabili-
ties, have received only limited and recent attention [13]–[17].
Decentralized detection schemes have also been studied for
fault detection and isolation (FDI). In such schemes, multiple
local detectors make inferences about either the global or local
process, and transmit their local decisions to a central entity,
which uses appropriate fusion rules to make the global deci-
sion [18]–[22]. Methods to improve the detection performance
by exchanging information among the local detectors have also
been proposed [23]–[25]. These decentralized algorithms are
typically complex [1], their effectiveness in detecting unknown
and unmeasurable attacks is difficult to characterize, and their
performance is believed to be inferior when compared to their
centralized counterparts. To the best of our knowledge, a
rigorous comparison of centralized and decentralized attack
detection schemes is still lacking, which prevents us from
assessing whether, and to what extent, decentralized and
distributed schemes should be employed for attack detection
and identification.
Main contributions:1 This paper features three main con-
tributions. First, we propose centralized and decentralized
schemes to detect unknown and unmeasurable sensor attacks
1In a preliminary version of this paper [26], we used asymptotic approxima-
tions to compare the detectors performance. Instead, in this paper we provide
stronger, tight, and non-asymptotic results without using any approximations.
Further, it contains new results on the design of optimal undetectable attacks,
and a characterization of the performance degradation induced by such attacks.
In addition, an illustration of the results using electrical power grid is also
presented.
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in stochastic interconnected systems. Our detection schemes
are based on the statistical decision theoretic framework that
falls under the category of simple versus composite hypotheses
testing. We characterize the probability of false alarm and the
probability of detection for both detectors, as a function of
the system and attack parameters. Second, we compare the
performance of the centralized and decentralized detectors,
and show that each detector can outperform the other for
certain system and attack configurations. We discuss that
this counterintuitive phenomenon is inherent with the simple
versus composite nature of the considered attack detection
problem, and provide numerical examples of this behavior.
Third, we formulate and solve an optimization problem to
design attacks against interconnected systems that maximally
affect the system performance as measured by the mean
square deviation of the state while remaining undetected by
the centralized and decentralized detectors with a pre-selected
probability. Finally, we validate our theoretical findings on the
IEEE RTS-96 power system model.
Paper organization: The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section II contains our problem formulation. In Section
III, we present our local, decentralized, and centralize detec-
tors, and characterize their performance. Section IV contains
our main results regarding the comparison of the performance
of centralized and decentralized detectors. Section V contains
the design of optimal undetectable attacks. Finally, Section VI
contains our numerical studies, and Section VII concludes the
paper.
Mathematical notation: The following notation will be
adopted throughout the paper. Let X1, . . . , XN be arbitrary
sets, then
⋃N
i=1Xi and
⋂N
i=1Xi denotes the union and inter-
section of the sets, respectively. Trace(·), Rank(·), and Null(·)
denote the trace, rank, and null space of a matrix, respectively.
Q > 0 (Q ≥ 0) denotes that Q is a positive definite (positive
semi definite) matrix. ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product for
matrices. blkdiag(A1, · · · , AN ) denotes the block diagonal
matrix with A1, · · · , AN as diagonal entries. The identity
matrix is denoted by I (or Idim to denote dimension explicitly).
Pr[E ] denotes the probability of the event E . The mean and
covariance of a real or vector valued random variable Y
is denoted by E[Y ] and Cov[Y ]. Further, for a real valued
random variable Y , we denote the standard deviation as
SD[Y ]. If Y follows a Gaussian distribution, we denote it by
Y ∼ N (E[Y ],Cov[Y ]). Instead, if Y follows a noncentral
chi-squared distribution, we denote it by Y ∼ χ2(p, λ),
where p is the degrees of freedom and λ is the non-centrality
parameter. For Y ∼ χ2(p, λ) and τ ≥ 0, Q(τ ; p, λ) denotes
the complementary cumulative distribution function of Y .
II. PROBLEM SETUP AND PRELIMINARY NOTIONS
We consider an interconnected system with N subsystems,
where each subsystem obeys the discrete-time linear dynamics
xi(k + 1) = Aiixi(k) +Biui(k) + wi(k),
yi(k) = Cixi(k) + vi(k),
(1)
with i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. In the above equation, the vectors
xi ∈ Rni and yi ∈ Rri are the state and measurement of
the i−th subsystem, respectively. The process noise wi(k) ∼
N (0,Σwi) and the measurement noise vi(k) ∼ N (0,Σvi) are
independent stochastic processes, and wi is assumed to be
independent of vi, for all k ≥ 0. Further, the noise vectors
across different subsystems are assumed to be independent
at all times. The i−th subsystem is coupled with the other
subsystems through the term Biui, which takes the form
Bi =
[
Ai1 · · · Ai,i−1 Ai,i+1 · · · AiN
]
, and
ui =
[
xT1 · · · xTi−1 xTi+1 · · · xTN
]T
.
The input Biui =
∑N
j 6=iAijxj represents the cumulative
effect of subsystems j on subsystem i. Hence, we refer to
Bi as to the interconnection matrix, and to ui as to the
interconnection signal, respectively.
We allow for the presence of attacks compromising the
dynamics of the subsystems, and model such attacks as
exogenous unknown inputs. In particular, the dynamics of the
i−th subsystem under the attack uai with matrix Bai read as
xi(k + 1) = Aiixi(k) +Biui(k) +B
a
i u
a
i (k) + wi(k), (2)
where uai ∈ Rmi . In vector form, the dynamics of the
interconnected system under attack read as
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Baua(k) + w(k),
y(k) = Cx(k) + v(k),
(3)
where φ =
[
φT1 . . . φ
T
N
]
, with φ standing for x ∈ Rn, w ∈
Rn, ua ∈ Rm, y ∈ Rr, v ∈ Rr, n = ∑Ni=1 ni, m = ∑Ni=1mi,
and r =
∑N
i ri. Moreover, as the components of the vectors w
and v are independent and Gaussian, w ∼ N (0,Σw) and v ∼
N (0,Σv), respectively, where Σw = blkdiag (Σw1 , . . . ,ΣwN )
and Σv = blkdiag (Σv1 , . . . ,ΣvN ). Further,
A =
A11 · · · A1N... . . . ...
AN1 · · · ANN
 , Ba =
B
a
1 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · BaN
 ,
and C = blkdiag (C1, . . . , CN ).
We assume that each subsystem is equipped with a local
detector, which uses the local measurements and knowledge
of the local dynamics to detect the presence of local attacks.
In particular, the i−th local detector has access to the mea-
surements yi in (1), knows the matrices Aii, Bi, and Ci,
and the statistical properties of the noise vectors wi and vi.
Yet, the i−th local detector does not know or measure the
interconnection input ui, and the attack parameters Bai and
uai . Based on this information, the i−th local detector aims to
detect whether Bai u
a
i 6= 0. The decisions of the local detectors
are then processed by a decentralized detector, which aims to
detect the presence of attacks against the whole interconnected
system based on the local decisions. Finally, we assume the
presence of a centralized detector, which has access to the
measurements y in (3), and knows the matrix A and the
statistical properties of the overall noise vectors w and v.
Similarly to the local detectors, the centralized detector does
not know or measure the attack parameters Ba and ua, and
aims to detect whether Baua 6= 0. We postpone a detailed
description of our detectors to Section III. To conclude this
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section, note that the decentralized and centralized detectors
have access to the same measurements. Yet, these detectors
differ in their knowledge of the system dynamics, which
determines their performance as explained in Section IV.
Remark 1: (Control input and initial state) The system
setup in (2) and (3) typically includes a control input. However,
assuming that each subsystem knows its control input, it can be
omitted without affecting generality. Further, as the detectors
do not have information about the initial state, we assume
without loss of generality, that the initial state is deterministic
and unknown to the detectors. 
III. LOCAL, DECENTRALIZED, AND CENTRALIZED
DETECTORS
In this section we formally describe our local, decentralized,
and centralized detectors, and characterize their performance
as a function of the available measurements and knowledge of
the system dynamics. To this aim, let T > 0 be an arbitrary
time horizon and define the vectors
Yi =
[
yTi (1) y
T
i (2) · · · yTi (T )
]T
, (4)
which contains the measurements available to the i−th detec-
tor, and
Yc =
[
yT(1) yT(2) · · · yT(T )]T , (5)
which contains the measurements available to the centralized
detector. Both the local and centralized detectors perform the
following three operations in order:
1) Collect measurements as in (4) and (5), respectively;
2) Process measurements to filter unknown variables; and
3) Perform statistical hypotheses testing to detect attacks
(locally or globally) using the processed measurements.
The decisions of the local detectors are then used by the
decentralized detector, which triggers an alarm if any of the
local detectors does so. We next characterize how the detectors
process their measurements and perform attack detection via
statistical hypothesis testing.
A. Processing of measurements
The measurements (4) and (5) depend on parameters that
are unknown to the detectors, namely, the system initial
state and the interconnection signal (although the process and
measurement noises are also unknown, the detectors know
their statistical properties). Thus, to test for the presence of
attacks, the detectors first process the measurement vectors to
eliminate their dependency on the unknown parameters. To do
so, using equations (1) and (2), define the observability matrix
and the attack, interconnection, and noise forced response
matrices of the i−th subsystem as
Oi =
CiAii...
CiA
T
ii
 , F (a)i =
 CiB
a
i . . . 0
...
. . .
...
CiA
T−1
ii B
a
i . . . CiB
a
i
 ,
F (u)i =
 CiBi . . . 0... . . . ...
CiA
T−1
ii Bi . . . CiBi
 , F (w)i =
 Ci . . . 0... . . . ...
CiA
T−1
ii . . . Ci
 .
Analogously, for the system model (3) define the matrices
Oc, F (w)a , and F (w)c , which are constructed as above by
replacing Ai, Bai , and Ci with A, B
a, and C, respectively.
The measurements (4) and (5) can be written as follows:
Yi = Oixi(0) + F (u)i Ui + F (a)i Uai + F (w)i Wi + Vi, (6)
Yc = Ocx(0) + F (a)c Ua + F (w)c W + V, (7)
where Ui =
[
uTi (0) u
T
i (1) · · · uTi (T − 1)
]T
. The vectors
Uai , U
a, Wi and W are the time aggregated signals of uai ,
ua, wi, and w, respectively, and are defined similarly to
Ui. Instead, Vi =
[
vTi (1) v
T
i (2) · · · vTi (T )
]T
, and V is
defined similarly to Vi. To eliminate the dependency from the
unknown variables, let Ni and Nc be bases of the left null
spaces of the matrices
[
Oi F (u)i
]
and Oc, respectively, and
define the processed measurements as
Y˜i = NiYi = Ni
[
F (a)i Uai + F (w)i Wi + Vi
]
,
Y˜c = NcYc = Nc
[
F (a)c Ua + F (w)c W + V
]
,
(8)
where the expressions for Y˜i and Y˜c follows from (6) and
(7). Notice that, in the absence of attacks (Ua = 0), the
measurements Y˜i and Y˜c depend only on the system noise.
Instead, in the presence of attacks, such measurements also
depend on the attack vector, which may leave a signature for
the detectors.2 We now characterize the statistical properties
of Y˜i and Y˜c.
Lemma 3.1: (Statistical properties of the processed mea-
surements) The processed measurements Y˜i and Y˜c satisfy
Y˜i ∼ N (βi,Σi) , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and
Y˜c ∼ N (βc,Σc) ,
(9)
where
βi = NiF (a)i Uai ,
βc = NcF (a)c Ua,
Σi = Ni
[(
F (w)i
)
(IT ⊗ Σwi)
(
F (w)i
)T
+ (IT ⊗ Σvi)
]
NTi ,
Σc = Nc
[(
F (w)c
)
(IT ⊗ Σw)
(
F (w)c
)T
+ (IT ⊗ Σv)
]
NTc .
(10)
A proof of Lemma 3.1 is postponed to the Appendix.
From Lemma 3.1, the mean vectors βi and βc depend on
the attack vector, while the covariance matrices Σi and Σc
are independent of the attack. This observation motivates us
to develop a detection mechanism based on the mean of the
processed measurements, rather the covariance matrices.
B. Statistical hypothesis testing framework
In this section we detail our attack detection mechanism,
which we assume to be the same for all local and centralized
detectors, and we characterize its false alarm and detection
probabilities. We start by analyzing the test procedure of the
2If Im(Bai ) ⊆ Im(Bi), then NiF(a)i = 0 and the processed measure-
ments do not depend on the attack. Thus, our local detection technique can
only be successful against attacks that do not satisfy this condition.
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i−th local detector. Let H0 be the null hypothesis, where
βi = 0 and the system is not under attack, and let H1 be the
alternative hypothesis, where βi 6= 0 and the system is under
attack. To decide which hypothesis is true, or equivalently
whether the mean value of the processed measurements is zero,
we resort to the generalized log-likelihood ratio test (GLRT):
Λi , Y˜ Ti Σ−1i Y˜i
H1
≷
H0
τi, (11)
where the threshold τi ≥ 0 is selected based on the desired
false alarm probability of the test (11) [27]. For a statistical
hypothesis testing problem, the false alarm probability equals
the probability of deciding for H1 when H0 is true, while
the detection probability equals the probability of deciding for
H1 when H1 is true. While the former is used for tuning the
threshold, the latter is used for measuring the performance of
the test. Formally, the false alarm and detection probabilities of
(11) are the probabilities that are conditioned on the hypothesis
H0 and H1, respectively, and are symbolically denoted as
PFi = Pr [Λi ≥ τi|H0] and PDi = Pr [Λi ≥ τi|H1] .
Similarly, the centralized detector test is defined as
Λc , Y˜ Tc Σ−1c Y˜c
H1
≷
H0
τc, (12)
where τc ≥ 0 is a preselected threshold, and its false alarm
and detection probabilities are denoted as PFc and P
D
c . We
next characterize the false alarm and detection probabilities of
the detectors with respect to the system and attack parameters.
Lemma 3.2: (False alarm and detection probabilities of
local and centralized detectors) The false alarm and the de-
tection probabilities of the tests (11) and (12) are, respectively,
PFi = Q(τi; pi, 0), P
D
i = Q(τi; pi, λi), and
PFc = Q(τc; pc, 0), P
D
c = Q(τc; pc, λc),
(13)
where
pi = Rank(Σi), pc = Rank(Σc),
λi = (U
a
i )
TMi(U
a
i ), λc = (U
a)TMc(U
a),
(14)
and
Mi =
(
NiF (a)i
)T
Σ−1i
(
NiF (a)i
)
,
Mc =
(
NcF (a)c
)T
Σ−1c
(
NcF (a)c
)
.
(15)
Lemma 3.2, whose proof is postponed to the Appendix,
allows us to compute the false alarm and detection prob-
abilities of the detectors using the decision thresholds, the
system parameters, and the attack vector. Moreover, for fixed
PFi and P
F
c , the detection thresholds are computed as τc =
Q−1(PFc ; pc, 0) and τi = Q
−1(PFi ; pi, 0), where Q
−1(·) is
the inverse of the complementary Cumulative Distribution
Functions (CDF) that is associated with a central chi-squared
distribution. The parameters pi, pc and λi, λc in Lemma
3.2 are referred to as degrees of freedom and non-centrality
parameters of the detectors.
Remark 2: (System theoretic interpretation of detection
probability parameters) The degrees of freedom and the non-
centrality parameters quantify the knowledge of the detectors
about the system dynamics and the energy of the attack signal
contained in the processed measurements. In particular:
(Degrees of freedom pi) The detection probability and the false
alarm probability are both increasing functions of the degrees
of freedom pi, because the Q function in (13) is an increasing
function of pi. Thus, increasing pi by, for instance, increasing
the number of sensors or the horizon T , does not necessarily
lead to an improvement of the detector performance.
(Non-centrality parameter λi) The non-centrality parameter
λi measures the energy of the attack signal contained in the
processed measurements. In the literature of communication
and signal processing, the non-centrality parameter is often
referred to as signal to noise ratio (SNR) [27]. For fixed τi
and pi, the detection probability increases monotonically with
λi, and approaches the false alarm probability as λi tends to
zero.
(Decision threshold τi) For fixed λi and pi, the probability of
detection and the false alarm probability are monotonically
decreasing functions of the detection threshold τi. This is
due to the fact that the complementary CDFs, which define
the false alarm and detection probabilities, are decreasing
functions of τi. As we show later, because of the contrasting
behaviors of the false alarm and detection probabilities with
respect to all individual parameters, the decentralized detector
can outperform the centralized detector. 
We now state a result that provides a relation between the
degrees of freedom (pi and pc) and the non-centrality param-
eters (λi and λc) of the local and the centralized detectors.
This result plays a central role in comparing the performance
of these centralized and decentralized detectors.
Lemma 3.3: (Degrees of freedom and non-centrality pa-
rameters) Let pi, pc and λi, λc be the degrees of freedom and
non-centrality parameters of the i−th local and centralized
detectors, respectively. Then, pi ≤ pc and λi ≤ λc for all i ∈
{1, . . . , N}.
A proof of Lemma 3.3 is postponed to the Appendix. In
loose words, given the interpretation of the degrees of freedom
and noncentrality parameters in Remark 2, Lemma (3.3) states
that a centralized detector has more knowledge about the
system dynamics (pi ≤ pc) and its measurements contain
a stronger attack signature (λi ≤ λc) than any of the i−th
local detector. Despite these properties, we will show that the
decentralized detector can outperform the centralized one.
IV. COMPARISON OF CENTRALIZED AND
DECENTRALIZED DETECTION OF ATTACKS
In this section we characterize the detection probabilities
of the decentralized and centralized detectors, and we derive
sufficient conditions for each detector to outperform the other.
Recall that the decentralized detector triggers an alarm if any
of the local detectors detects an alarm. In other words,
PFd = Pr [Λi ≥ τi, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N} |H0] ,
PDd = Pr [Λi ≥ τi, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N} |H1] ,
(16)
where PFd and P
D
d denote the false alarm and detection
probabilities of the decentralized detector, respectively.
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Fig. 1. This figure shows the false alarm probability of the decentralized
detector, PFd , as a function of the identical false alarm probabilities of
the local detectors, PFi , for different numbers of local detectors.
Lemma 4.1: (Performance of the decentralized detector)
The false alarm and detection probabilities in (16) satisfy
PFd = 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PFi
)
, and PDd = 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PDi
)
.
(17)
A proof of Lemma 4.1 is postponed to the Appendix. As
shown in Fig. 1, for the case when PFi = P
F
j , for all
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, PFd increases with increase in PFi and
N . To allow for a fair comparison between the decentral-
ized and centralized detectors, we assume that PFc = P
F
d .
Consequently, for a fixed false alarm probability PFc , the
probabilities PFi satisfy
PFc = 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PFi
)
.
We now derive a sufficient condition for the centralized
detector to outperform the decentralized detector.
Theorem 4.2: (Sufficient condition for PDc ≥ PDd ) Let
PFc = P
F
d , and assume that the following condition is
satisfied:
τc ≤ pc + λc −
√
4N(pc + 2λc) ln
(
1
1− PDmax
)
, (18)
where PDmax = max{PD1 , . . . , PDN }. Then, PDc ≥ PDd .
A proof of Theorem 4.2 is postponed to the Appendix. We
next derive a sufficient condition for the decentralized detector
to outperform the centralized detector.
Theorem 4.3: (Sufficient condition for PDd ≥ PDc ) Let
PFc = P
F
d , and assume that the following condition is
satisfied:
τc ≥ pc + λc +
√
4 (pc + 2λc) ln
(
1
1− (1− PDmin)N
)
+
+ 2 ln
(
1
1− (1− PDmin)N
)
,
(19)
where PDmin = min{PD1 , . . . , PDN }. Then PDd ≥ PDc .
A proof of Theorem 4.2 is postponed to the Appendix.
Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 provide sufficient conditions on the
detectors and attack parameters that result in one detector
outperforming the other. In particular, from (18) and (19) we
Fig. 2. This figure shows the probability density function (pdf) of Λc
under H1, as a function of threshold τc. For τc = µc − κcσc and
τc = µc + κdσd + σ
2
d, the shaded area in panels (a) and (b)
indicates the detection probability of the centralized detector. As seen
in panels (a) and (b), an increase in κc results in larger area (larger
detection probability) while a increase in κd results in smaller area
(smaller detection probability).
note that, depending on decision threshold τc, a centralized
detector may or may not outperform a decentralized detector.
This is intuitive as the Q function, which quantifies the
detection probability, is a decreasing function of the detection
threshold (see Remark 2). To clarify the effect of attack and
detection parameters on the performance trade-offs of the
detectors, we now express (18) and (19) using the mean and
standard deviation of the test statistic Λc in (12). Let
µc , E [Λc] = λc + pc, and
σc , SD[Λc] =
√
2(pc + 2λc).
where the expectation and standard deviation (SD) of Λc
follows from the fact that under H1, Λc ∼ χ2(pc, λc) (see
proof of Lemma 3.2). Hence, (18) and (19) can be rewritten,
respectively, as
τc ≤ µc − σc
√
2N ln
(
1
1− PDmax
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,κc
, and (20a)
τc ≥ µc + σc
√
2 ln
(
1
1− (1− PDmin)N
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,κd
+κ2d. (20b)
From (20a) and (20b) we note that a centralized detector out-
performs the decentralized one if τc is κc standard deviations
smaller than the mean µc. Instead, a decentralized detector
outperforms the centralized detector if τc is at least κd standard
deviations larger than the mean µc. See Fig. 2 for a graphical
illustration of this interpretation.
Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 are illustrated in Fig. 3 as a function
of the non-centrality parameters. It can be observed that (i)
each of the detectors can outperform the other depending
on the values of the noncentrality parameter values, (ii) the
provided bounds qualitatively capture the actual performance
of the centralized and decentralized detectors as the non-
centrality parameters increase, and (iii) the provided bounds
are rather tight over a large range of non-centrality parameters.
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Fig. 3. This figure shows when the decentralized, which comprises
identical local detectors, and centralized detectors outperform their
counterpart, as a function of the non-centrality parameters. The regions
identified by solid markers correspond to the conditions in Theorems
4.2 and 4.3. Instead, regions identified by empty markers are identified
numerically. Since λi ≤ λc, the white region (top left) is not admissible.
For a fixed PFc = PFd = 0.01, (a) corresponds to the case of
N = 2 and (b) corresponds to the case of N = 4. When N = 4,
the decentralized detector outperforms the centralized one for a larger
set of noncentrality parameters.
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Fig. 4. This figure shows the difference of the centralized and decen-
tralized detection probabilities as a function of λi for different values of
λc. For small values of λc, the detection probability of the decentralized
detector can be substantially larger than its centralized counterpart.
In Fig. 4 we show that the difference of the detection prob-
abilities of the centralized and decentralized detectors can be
large, especially when the non-centrality parameters are small
and satisfy λc ≈ λi, as evident in panel (a) of Fig. 4 .
V. DESIGN OF OPTIMAL ATTACKS
In this section we consider the problem of designing attacks
that deteriorate the performance of the interconnected sys-
tem (1) while remaining undetected from the centralized and
decentralized detectors. We measure the degradation induced
by an attack with the expected value of the deviation of
the state trajectory from the origin. We assume that the
attack is a deterministic signal, and thus independent of the
noise affecting the system dynamics and measurements. In
particular, for a fixed value of the probability PFc and a
threshold PFc ≤ δc ≤ 1, we consider the optimization problem
(P.1) max
Ua
E
[
T∑
k=1
x(k)Tx(k)
]
,
subject to PDc ≤ δc,
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Baua(k) + w(k),
where Ua is the deterministic attack input over time horizon
T (see (7)). Notice that, because the attack is deterministic,
the objective function in (P.1) can be simplified by bringing
the expectation inside the summation, and replacing the state
equation constraint with the mean state response. Further,
because the system parameters and PFc are fixed, τc and
pc are also fixed, which ensures that PDd only depends on
noncentrality parameter. This observation along with the fact
that Q(·) is increasing function in noncentrality parameter (see
Remark 2) allows us to express the detection constraint in
terms of λc. Specifically, the optimization problem (P.1) can
be rewritten as
(P.2) max
Ua
T∑
k=1
x(k)Tx(k)
subject to (Ua)TMc(Ua) ≤ δ˜c,
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Baua(k),
where we have used that Cov [x(k)] is independent of the
attack ua(k), and
E[x(k)Tx(k)] = x(k)Tx(k) + Trace (Cov [x(k)]) ,
with x(k) = E[x(k)]. Further, we have δ˜c = Q−1pc,τc(δc),
where Q−1pc,τc(α) : [0, 1] → [0,∞] denotes the inverse of
Q(τc; pc, λc) for fixed pc and τc, and λc = (Ua)TMc(Ua),
with Mc as in (15). It should be noticed that the attack
constraint in (P.2) essentially limits the (weighted) energy of
the attack signal. We next characterize the solution to the
optimization problem (P.2).
Theorem 5.1: (Optimal attack vectors) Let U∗c be any
solution of (P.2). Then, there exist a γc > 0 such that the
pair (U∗c , γc) solves the following optimality equations:[BTaBa − γcMc]U∗c + BTaAx(0) = 0, (21a)
(U∗c )
T
Mc(U
∗
c ) = δ˜c, (21b)
where
A =
 A...
AT
 and Ba =
 B
a · · · 0
...
. . .
...
AT−1Ba . . . Ba
 . (22)
A proof of Theorem 5.1 is postponed to the Appendix.
Theorem 5.1 not only guarantees the existence of optimal
attacks, but it also provides us with necessary conditions to
verify if an attack is (locally) optimal. When the system initial
state is zero, we can also quantify the performance degradation
induced by an optimal attack. Let ρmax(A,B) and νmax(A,B)
denote a largest generalized eigenvalue of a matrix pair (A,B)
and one of its associated generalized eigenvectors [28].
Lemma 5.2: (System degradation with zero initial state)
Let x(0) = 0. Then, the optimal solution to (P.2) is
U∗c =
√ δ˜c
(ν∗)TMc(ν∗)
 ν∗, (23)
and its associated optimal cost is
J∗c = δ˜c ρmax
(BTaBa,Mc) , (24)
where ν∗ = νmax
(BTaBa,Mc).
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A proof of Lemma 5.2 is postponed to the Appendix. From
(24), notice that the system degradation caused by an optimal
attack depends on the detector’s tolerance, as measured by
δ˜c, and the system dynamics, as measured by ρmax (·). See
Remark 4 for the influence of processed measurement’s noise
uncertainty on the system degradation due to optimal attacks.
Remark 3: (Optimal attack vector against decentralized
detector) To characterize the performance degradation of the
system analytically, we consider a relaxed form of detection
constraint. Specifically, we design optimal attacks subjected to
P
D
d ≤ δd instead of PDd ≤ δd, where P
D
d is an upper bound on
PDd (see Lemma A.2). The design of optimal attacks that are
undetectable from the decentralized detector can be formulated
in the following way:
(P.3) max
Ua
T∑
k=1
x(k)Tx(k)
subject to
N∑
i=1
(Uai )
TMi(U
a
i ) ≤ δ˜d,
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Baua(k),
where the summation in the detectability constraint follows
from Lemma A.2 and the fact that P
D
d ≤ δd becomes
equivalent to
∑N
i=1 λi ≤ δ˜d, where δ˜d = Q−1psum,τmin(δd),
psum =
∑N
i=1 pi, and τmin = min1≤i≤N
τi. Let Πi be a permutation
matrix such that Uai = ΠiU
a, and let Π =
[
ΠT1 , . . . ,Π
T
N
]T
and Md = ΠTblkdiag(M1, . . . ,MN )Π. For any solution U∗d
of (P.2), there exist γd > 0 such that the pair (U∗d , γd) solves
the following optimality equations:[BTaBa − γdMd]U∗d + BTaAx(0) = 0, and
(U∗d )
T
Md(U
∗
d ) = δ˜d.
Further, if x(0) = 0, then the largest degradation is J∗d =
δ˜d ρmax
(BTaBa,Md). 
Remark 4: (Maximum degradation of the system perfor-
mance with respect to system noise) To see the role of
noise level, in the processed measurements, on the system
degradation, we consider the following covariance matrices:
Σwi = σ
2Ini and Σvi = σ
2Iri , for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then,
from (24) we have
J∗c = σ
2 δ˜c
[
ρmax
(
BTaBa, M˜c
)]
, (25)
where M˜c =
(
NcF (a)c
)T [
F (w)c
(
F (w)c
)T
+ I
]−1 (
NcF (a)c
)
.
From (25) we note that the system degradation increases with
the increase in the noise level, i.e., σ2. 
VI. NUMERICAL COMPARISON OF CENTRALIZED AND
DECENTRALIZED DETECTORS
In this section, we demonstrate our theoretical findings on
the IEEE RTS-96 power network model [29], which we parti-
tion into three subregions as shown in Fig. 5. We followed the
approach in [30] to obtain a linear time-invariant model of the
power network, and then discretized it using a sampling time
of 0.01 seconds. For a false alarm probability PFc = P
F
d =
Fig. 5. The figure shows a single-line diagram of IEEE RTS96 power
network, which is composed of three weakly-coupled areas (subsys-
tems). The square nodes denote the generators, while the circular nodes
denotes the load buses of the network [30].
0.05, we consider the family of attacks Ua =
√
θ/(1TMc1)1,
where 1 is the vector of all ones and θ > 0. It can be
shown that the noncentrality parameters satisfy λc = θ and
λi = θ(1
TMi1)/(1
TMc1), and moreover, the choice of vector
1 is arbitrary and it does not affecting the following results.
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Fig. 6. An illustration of a scenario in which the centralized detector
outperforms the decentralized detector for the IEEE RTS-96 power
network. In panel (a), we plot the detection probabilities of the detectors
with respect to the attack parameter θ. Instead, in panel (b) we plot the
right (solid line) and left hand expressions (dashed line) of the inequality
in (20a) as a function of θ. For attacks such that θ > 200, the sufficient
condition (20a) holds true, it guarantees that PDc ≥ PDd .
(Illustration of Theorem 4.2) For the measurement horizon of
T = 100 seconds, the values of pc and τc are 5130 and 5480.6,
respectively. Fig. 6 show that the detection probabilities of the
centralized and decentralized detectors increase monotonically
with the attack parameter θ. As predicted by the sufficient
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condition (20a) and shown in Fig. 6, the centralized detector is
guaranteed to outperform the decentralized detector when θ >
173. This figure also shows that our condition is conservative,
because PDc ≥ PDd for all values of θ as shown in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 7. An illustration of a scenario in which the decentralized detector
outperforms the centralized detector for the IEEE RTS-96 power net-
work. In panel (a), we plot the detection probabilities of the detectors
with respect to the attack parameter θ. Instead, in panel (b) we plot the
right (solid line) and left hand expressions (dashed line) of the inequality
in (20b) as a function of θ. For attacks such that θ < 500, the sufficient
condition (20b) holds true, and it guarantees that PDc ≤ PDd .
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Fig. 8. This figure shows the performance degradation induced by
undetectable optimal attacks on the IEEE RTS-96 power network. The
performance degradation is computed using the optimal cost J∗c and
J∗d derived in Lemma 5.2 and Remark 3, respectively. Instead, the
maximum detection probability is given by the tuning parameters δc and
δd in the detection probability constraints of the optimization problems
(P.2) and (P.3), respectively.
(Illustration of Theorem 4.3) Contrary to the previous example,
by letting T = 125 seconds, we obtain pc = 6755 and
τc = 6947.3. For these choice of parameters, the decentralized
detector is guaranteed to outperform the centralized detector
when θ ≤ 511. This behavior is predicted by our sufficient
condition (20b), and it is illustrated in Fig. 7. As in the
previous example, the estimation provided by our condition
(20b) is conservative, as illustrated in Fig. 7.
(Illustration of Lemma 5.2) In Fig. 8 we compare the perfor-
mance degradation induced by the optimal attacks designed
according to the optimization problems (P.2) and (P.3) with
zero initial conditions. In particular, we plot the optimal costs
J∗c and J
∗
d against the tolerance levels δ˜c and δ˜d, respectively.
As expected, the performance degradation is proportional to
the tolerance levels and, for the considered setup, it is larger
in the case of the decentralized detector.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we compare the performance of centralized
and decentralized schemes for the detection of attacks in
stochastic interconnected systems. In addition to quantifying
the performance of each detection scheme, we prove the
counterintuitive result that the decentralized scheme can, at
times, outperform its centralized counterpart, and that this
behavior results due to the simple versus composite nature of
the attack detection problem. We illustrate our findings through
academic examples and a case study based on the IEEE RTS-
96 power system. Several questions remain of interest for
future investigation, including the characterization of optimal
detection schemes, an analytical comparison of the degradation
induced by undetectable attacks as a function of the detection
scheme, and the analysis of iterative detection strategies.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 3.1:
Since the attack vectors Uai and U
a are deterministic, and
Wi, Vi, V , and W are zero mean random vectors, from the
linearity of the expectation operator it follows from (8) that
βi , E[Y˜i] = NiF (a)i Uai , and
βc , E[Y˜c] = NcF (a)c Uac .
Further, from the properties of Cov[·], we have the following:
Σi , Cov
[
Y˜i
]
= NiCov [Yi]N
T
i
(a)
= Ni
[
Cov
[
F (w)i Wi
]
+ Cov[Vi]
]
NTi
(b)
= Ni
[(
F (w)i
)
Cov [Wi]
(
F (w)i
)T
+ Cov[Vi]
]
NTi
= Ni
[(
F (w)i
)
(IT ⊗ Σwi)
(
F (w)i
)T
+ (IT ⊗ Σvi)
]
NTi ,
where (a) follows because the measurement and process noises
are independent of each other. Instead, (b) is due to the fact that
the noise vectors are independent and identically distributed.
Similar analysis also results in the expression of Σc, and hence
the details are omitted. Finally, by invoking the fact that linear
transformations preserve Gaussianity, the distribution of Y˜i and
Y˜c is Gaussian as well.
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
From the statistics and distributional form of Y˜i and Y˜c (see
(9)), and threshold tests defined in (11) and (12), it follows
from [31, Theorem 3.3.3] that, under
1) null hypothesis H0: Λi ∼ χ2(pi) and Λc ∼ χ2(pc),
where pi and pc are defined in (14).
2) alternative hypothesis H1: Λi ∼ χ2(pi, λi) and Λc ∼
χ2(pc, λc), where λi = βTi Σ
−1
i βi and λc = β
T
c Σ
−1
c βc.
By substituting βi = NiF (a)i Uai and βc = NcF (a)c Uac (see
Lemma 3.1) and rearranging the terms, we get the expressions
of λi and λc in (14). Finally, from the aforementioned distribu-
tional forms of Λi and Λc, it now follows that the false alarm
and the detection probabilities of the tests (11) and (12) are
the right tail probabilities (represented by Q(·) function) of the
central and noncentral chi-squared distributions, respectively.
Hence, the expressions in (13) follow.
Proof of Lemma 3.3:
Without loss of generality let i = 1. Thus, it suffices to
show that a) p1 ≤ pc and b) λ1 ≤ λc.
Case (a): For brevity, define
Σ˜i =
[(
F (w)i
)
(IT ⊗ Σwi)
(
F (w)i
)T
+ (IT ⊗ Σvi)
]
and
Σ˜c =
[(
F (w)c
)
(IT ⊗ Σw)
(
F (w)c
)T
+ (IT ⊗ Σv)
]
,
(26)
and note that Σ˜i > 0 and Σ˜c > 0. From Lemma 3.1, Lemma
3.2, and (26), we have
pc = Rank(Σc) = Rank
((
NcΣ˜
1/2
c
)(
NcΣ˜
1/2
c
)T)
= Rank
(
NcΣ˜
1/2
)
= Rank (Nc) .
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Similarly, p1 = Rank (N1). Since, NT1 and N
T
c are a basis
vectors of the null spaces NL1 and NLc (see (37)) respectively,
it follows from Proposition A.1 that p1 ≤ pc.
Case (b): As the proof for this result is rather long and tedious,
we break it down in to multiple steps:
• Step 1: Express λ1 and λc using the statistics of a
permuted version of Yc.
• Step 2: Obtain lower bound on λc, which depends on the
statistics of the measurements pertaining to Subsystem 1.
• Step 3: Show that λ1 is less than bound in Step 2.
Step 1 (alternative form of λ1 and λc):
Notice that λ1 and λc in (14) can be expressed as λ1 =
βT1 Σ
−1
1 β1 and λc = β
T
c Σ
−1
c βc, respectively, where β1, βc,
Σ1, and Σc are defined in Lemma 3.1. For convenience, we
express λ1 and λc in an alternative way. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
and consider the i−th sensor measurements of (3)
yc,i(k) =
[
0 · · · Ci · · · 0
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Cc,i
x(k) + vi(k). (27)
Also, define Yc,i =
[
yTc,i(1) . . . y
T
c,i(T )
]T
and Ŷc =[
Y Tc,1 . . . Y
T
c,N
]
. Now, from (27) and state equation in (3),
Yc,i can be expanded as
Yc,i = Oc,ix(0) + F (a)c,i Ua + F (w)c,i W + Vi,
where the matrices Oc,i, F (a)c,i , and F (w)c,i are similar to the
matrices defined in Section II-A. By substituting the above
decomposition of Yc,i in Ŷ we have
Ŷc =
Oc,1...
Oc,N

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ôc
x(0) +

F (a)c,1
...
F (a)c,N

︸ ︷︷ ︸
F̂ac
Ua +

F (w)c,1
...
F (w)c,N

︸ ︷︷ ︸
F̂wc
W + V.
Moreover, from the distributional assumptions on W and V ,
it readily follows that (similarly to the proof of Lemma 3.1),
Ŷc ∼ N
(
Ôcx(0) + F̂ac Ua,Σ
)
, (28)
where Σ =
(
F̂wc
)
(IT ⊗ Σw)
(
F̂wc
)T
+ (IT ⊗ Σv), and Σw
and Σv are defined same as in Lemma 3.1.
Now, consider the measurement equation yi(k) in (1) and
note that Cc,ix(k) = Cixi(k). Thus, yi(k) = yc,i(k), for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and k ∈ N. From this observation it follows
that Yi = Yc,i = ΠiŶc, where Πi is a selection matrix. Let
N˜i = NiΠi and note that N˜iÔ = NiOc,i. Further from
Proposition A.1 we have NiOc,i = 0. With these facts in
place, from Lemma 3.1 we now have
βi = N˜iF̂ac Ua, and
Σi = N˜iΣN˜
T
i .
(29)
Similarly, since Ŷc is just a rearrangement of Yc (see (5)),
there exists a permutation matrix Q such that Yc = QŶc, and,
ultimately Y˜c = NcYc = NcQŶc. Thus,
βc = NcQF̂ac Ua, and
Σc = NcQΣ(NcQ)
T.
(30)
Let z = F̂ac Ua. From (29) and (30) we have
λ1 = z
TN˜T1
[
N˜1ΣN˜
T
1
]−1
N˜1,
λc = z
T (NcQ)
T
[
(NcQ) Σ (NcQ)
T
]−1
(NcQ) .
(31)
Step 2 (lower bound on λc):
Since, Yc = NcYc = NcQŶc, it follows that NcQ is the
basis of the null space Ôc. Further, the row vectors of Oc,i
and Oc,j are linearly independent, whenever i 6= j. Using
these facts we can define Nc,i =
[
N ic,i · · · NNc,i
]
such that
NcQ =
[
NTc,1 · · · NTc,N
]T
, where N ic,iOc,i = 0. Let P1 =[
(Nc,2)
T · · · (Nc,N )T
]T
and note that
(NcQ) Σ (NcQ)
T
=
[
Nc,1
P1
]
Σ
[
NTc,1 P
T
1
]
=
[
Nc,1ΣN
T
c,1 Nc,1ΣP
T
1
NTc,1ΣP1 P
T
1 ΣP1
]
.
Let S1 = Nc,1ΣNTc,1. Since Σ > 0, it follows that both the
matrices S1 and PT1 ΣP1 are invertible. Hence, from Schur’s
complement, there exists a matrix X ≥ 0 such that[
(NcQ) Σ (NcQ)
T
]−1
=
[
S−11 0
0 0
]
+X. (32)
Similarly, consider the following partition of Σ:
Σ =
[
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
]
,
where Σ11 > 0 and Σ22 > 0, and let S2 = (N1c,1)Σ11(N
1
c,1)
T.
Invoking Schur’s complement, we have the following:
S−11 =
[
S−12 0
0 0
]
+ Y, (33)
where Y ≥ 0. Substituting(32) and (33) in (31), we have
λc = z
T(NcQ)
T
[
S−11 0
0 0
]
(NcQ)z + z
T(NcQ)
TX(NcQ)z︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ [(Nc,1z)T (P1z)T] [S−11 00 0
] [
Nc,1z
P1z
]
= zT
(
NTc,1S
−1
1 Nc,1
)
z
= zT(Nc,1)
T
[
S−12 0
0 0
]
(Nc,1)z + z
T(Nc,1)
TY (Nc,1)z︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ zT(Nc,1)T
[
S−12 0
0 0
]
(Nc,1)z
= zT
[
(N1c,1)
TS−12 N
1
c,1 0
0 0
]
z. (34)
Instead, λ1 in (31) can be shown as
λ1 = z
T
[
NT1
[
N1Σ11N
T
1
]−1
N1 0
0 0
]
z, (35)
where we used the fact that N˜1 = N1Π1.
Step 3 (λc ≥ λ1):
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For λc ≥ λ1 to hold true, it suffices to show the following:
(N1c,1)
TS−12 N
1
c,1 ≥ NT1
[
N1Σ11N
T
1
]−1
N1.
By invoking Proposition A.1, we note that there exists a full
row rank matrix F1, such that N1 = F1N1c,1. Since F
T
1 is a
full column rank matrix, we can define an invertible matrix
F˜T1 ,
[
FT1 M
T
1
]
, where M1 forms a basis for null space of
F1, such that the following holds
S−12 = F˜
T
1
[
F˜1S2F˜
T
1
]−1
F˜1
= F˜T1
[
F1S2F
T
1 F1S2M
T
1
M1S2F
T
1 M1S2M
T
1
]−1
F˜1.
By invoking Schur’s complement, it follows that[
F1S2F
T
1 F1S2M
T
1
M1S2F
T
1 M1S2M
T
1
]−1
=
[(
F1S2F
T
1
)−1
0
0 0
]
+ Y,
where Z ≥ 0. Hence,
(N1c,1)
TS−12 N
1
c,1 = (F˜1N
1
c,1)
T
[(
F1S2F
T
1
)−1
0
0 0
]
(F˜1N
1
c,1)
+ (F˜1N
1
c,1)
TZ(F˜1N
1
c,1).
By substituting F˜T1 = [F
T
1 M
T
1 ] in the above expression, and
rearranging the terms we have
(N1c,1)
TS−12 N
1
c,1 = (F1N
1
c,1)
T
(
F1S2F
T
1
)−1
(F1N
1
c,1)
+ (F˜1N
1
c,1)
TZ(F˜1N
1
c,1).
The required inequality follows by substituting S2 =
(N1c,1)Σ11(N
1
c,1)
T and N1 = F1Nc,1, and recalling the fact
that the sum of two positive semi definite matrices is greater
than or equal to either of the matrices.
Proof of Lemma 4.1:
Let Ei be an event that the i−th local detector decides H1
when the true hypothesis is H0. Then, PFi = Pr [Ei] . Let E{i
be the complement of Ei. Then, from (16) it follows that
PFd = Pr
(
N⋃
i=i
Ei
)
= 1− Pr
(
N⋂
i=i
E{i
)
(a)
= 1−
N∏
i=1
Pr
(
E{i
)
= 1−
N∏
i=1
(1− Pr (Ei)) = 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PFi
)
,
where for the (a) we used the fact that the events Ei are
mutually independent for all i ∈ {1, . . . N}. To see this fact,
notice that the event Ei is defined on Y˜i (see (8)). Further, Y˜i
depends only on the deterministic attack signal Uai and the
noise vectors Vi and Wi, but not on the interconnection signal
Ui (see (6)). Now, by invoking the fact that noises variables
across different subsystems are independent, it also follows
that the events Ei are also mutually independent. Similar
procedure will lead to the analogous expression for PDd and
hence, the details are omitted.
Proof of Theorem 4.2:
Let µc = pc + λc and σc =
√
2(pc + 2λc), and assume
that (18) holds true. Then, from the monotonicity property of
the CDF associated with the test statistic Λc, which follows
χ2(pc, λc), we have the following inequality
Pr [Λc ≤ τc] ≤ Pr
[
Λc ≤ µc − σc
√
2N ln
(
1
1− PDmax
)]
.
From the inequality (41b), it now follows that
Pr [Λc ≤ τc] ≤ exp
(
−N ln
(
1
1− PDmax
))
= exp
(
ln
(
1− PDmax
)N) ≤ N∏
i=1
(
1− PDi
)
,
where for the last inequality we used the fact that PDi ≤ PDmax
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. By using the above inequality and
Lemma 3.2, under hypothesis H1, we have
PDc = 1− Pr [Λc ≤ τc|H1] ≥ 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PDi
)
= PDd .
Proof of Theorem 4.3
Let µc = pc + λc and σc =
√
2(pc + 2λc), and assume
that (19) holds true. Then, from the monotonicity property of
the CDF associated with the test statistic Λc, which follows
χ2(pc, λc), we have the following inequality
Pr [Λc ≤ τc] ≥ Pr
[
Λc ≤ µc + σc
√
2 ln
(
1
1− (1− PDmin)N
)
+ 2 ln
(
1
1− (1− PDmin)N
)]
.
From the inequality (41a), it now follows that
Pr [Λc ≤ τc] ≥ 1− exp
(
− ln
(
1
1− (1− PDmin)N
))
,
= 1− exp
(
ln
(
1− (1− PDmin)N)) ,
≥
N∏
i=1
(
1− PDi
)
= 1−
[
1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PDi
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
PDd
.
The result follows by substituting PDc = 1−Pr [Λc ≤ τc|H1]
in the above inequality.
Proof of Theorem 5.1
By recursively expanding the equality constraint of the
optimization problem (P.2) we havex(1)...
x(T )
 = Ax(0) + BaUa
By using the above identity, (P.2) can also be expressed as
max
Ua
[Ax(0) + BaUa]T [Ax(0) + BaUa]︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(Ua)
subject to (Ua)TMc(Ua) ≤ δ˜c.
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From the first-order necessary conditions [32] we now have
∇ (f(U∗c )− γ(U∗c )TMc(U∗c )) = 0, (36a)
γ
(
δ˜c − (U∗c )TMc(U∗c )
)
= 0, (36b)
γ ≥ 0, (36c)
(U∗c )
TMc(U
∗
c ) ≤ δ˜c, (36d)
where the gradient ∇ is with respect to Ua.
Case (i): Suppose (U∗c )
TMc(U
∗
c ) < δ˜c. Then γ = 0 should
hold true to ensure the complementarity slackness condition
(36b). Using these observations in the KKT conditions we now
have ∇f(U∗c ) = 0. Further, since, f(Ua) is a convex function
of Ua, by evaluating the second derivative of f(Ua) at U∗c , it
can be easily seen that the obtained U∗c results in minimum
value of (P.2) rather than the maximum.Thus, for any U∗c of
(P.2), the condition (U∗c )
TMc(U
∗
c ) < δ˜c cannot hold true.
Case (ii): Suppose (U∗c )
TMc(U
∗
c ) = δ˜c. Then the KKT
conditions can be simplified to the following:
∇ (f(U∗c )− γ(U∗c )TMc(U∗c )) = 0,
(U∗c )
TMc(U
∗
c ) = δ˜c.
The result now follows by evaluating the derivative on the left
hand side of the first equality.
Proof of Lemma 5.2
By substituting x(0) = 0 in (21a), we note that any optimal
attack U∗c is of the form kν, where ν is the generalized
eigenvector of the pair (BTaB,Mc) [28], and the scalar k =√
δ˜c/νTMcν is obtained from (21b). Let Jc be the optimal
cost associated with an attack of the form U∗c = kν. Then,
Jc = (kν)
TBTaBa(kν) = γ(kν)TMc(kν) = γδ˜c,
where the first equality follows from the fact that the objec-
tive function
∑T
k=1 x
T(k)x(k) in (P.2) can be expressed as
(U∗c )
TBTaBa(U∗c ), and the second equality follows from (21a).
Since ν is a generalized eigenvector of the pair (BTaB,Mc), it
follows that γ is the eigenvalue corresponding to ν and hence,
Jc is maximized when γ is maximum, which is obtained for
v = v?. The result follows since, γ = ρmax, for v = v?.
Proposition A.1: Let Oi F (u)i be the observability and
impulse response matrices defined in (6). Define
NLi =
{
z : zT
[
Oi F (u)i
]
= 0T
}
,
NLc,i =
{
z : zTOc,i = 0T
}
, and
NLc =
N⋃
i=1
NLc,i.
(37)
where Oc,i =
[
(Cc,iA)
T · · · (Cc,iAT )T]T and Cc,i =[
0 · · · Ci · · · 0
]
. Then, NLi ⊆ NLc,i ⊆ NLc , for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Proof: Without loss of generality, let i = 1. By definition,
the set inclusion NLc,1 ⊆ NLc is trivial. For the other inclusion,
consider the system defined in (3) without the attack and noise,
i.e., x(k+ 1) = Ax(k). Let x(k) =
[
xT1 (k) u
T
1 (k)
]T
, where
x1(k) and u1(k) are the state and the interconnection signal
of Subsystem 1. Also, let
A =
[
A11 B1
B˜1 A˜11
]
. (38)
Notice that, x(k + 1) = Ax(k) can be decomposed as
x1(k + 1) = A11x1(k) +B1u1(k),
u1(k + 1) = A˜11u1(k) + B˜1x1(k).
(39)
By letting C˜1 =
[
C1A11 C1B1
]
and recursively expanding
x1(k) using (39), we have
Cc,1A
kx(0) =
[
C1 0
]
AAk−1x(0)
= C˜1A
k−1x(0)
= C˜1
[
x1(k − 1)
u1(k − 1)
]
= C˜1
[
Ak−111 x1(0) +
∑k−2
j=0 A
k−2−j
11 B1u1(j)
u1(k − 1)
]
= C1A
k
11x1(0) +
k−1∑
j=0
C1A
k−1−j
11 B1u1(j), (40)
where the second, third, and fourth equalities follows from
(38), system x(k + 1) = Ax(k), and (39), respectively. By
recalling that Oc,1x(0) =
[
(Cc,1A)
T · · · (Cc,1AT )T]T x(0),
it follows from (40) that
Oc,1x(0) = O1x1(0) + F (u)1
[
uT1 (0) · · · uT1 (T − 1)
]T
.
Let z be any vector such that zT
[
O1 F (u)1
]
= 0T. Then, z
also satisfies zTOc,1 = 0T. Thus, NL1 ⊆ NLc,1.
Lemma A.2: (Upper bound on PDd ) Let pi and λi be
defined as in (14), and τi be defined as in (11). Let psum =∑N
i=1 pi, λsum =
∑N
i=1 λi, and τmin = min1≤i≤N
τi. Then,
PDd ≤ Pr [Sd > τmin]︸ ︷︷ ︸
,PDd
,
where Sd ∼ χ2(psum, λsum).
Proof: Consider the following events:
Vi =
{
Y˜ Ti Σ
−1
i Y˜i ≥ τi
}
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and
V =
{
N∑
i=1
Y˜ Ti Σ
−1
i Y˜i ≥ τmin
}
,
where the event Vi is associated with the i−th local detector’s
threshold test. From the definition of the above events, it is
easy to note that
⋃N
i=1 Vi ⊆ V . By the monotonicity of the
probability measures, it follows that
PDd , Pr
[
N⋃
i=1
Vi |H1
]
≤ Pr [V |H1] .
From the reproducibility property of the noncentral chi-
squared distribution [33], it now follows that
∑N
i=1 Y˜
T
i Σ
−1
i Y˜i
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equals Sd in distribution and hence, Pr[V|H1] = Pr[Sd >
τmin].
Lemma A.3: (Exponential bounds on the tails of
χ2(p, λ)) Let Y ∼ χ2(p, λ), µ = p + λ, σ = √2(p+ 2λ).
For all x > 0,
Pr
[
Y ≥ µ+ σ
√
2x+ 2x
]
≤ exp(−x) (41a)
Pr
[
Y ≤ µ− σ
√
2x
]
≤ exp(−x) (41b)
Proof: See [34].
